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Abstract
Many contemporary philosophical theories of morality oper-
ate according to crude logical examples. For instance: ‘setting a
cat on fire is wrong’. Schille’s robbed man scenarios from his
Kallias letters tell a subtler tale. In this paper, I claim that with the
notion of moral beauty, Schiller substantially transcends contem-
porary philosophical approaches to moral perception by (i) lead-
ing the eye to the ‘how’, rather than only to the ‘what’ of an
action, (ii) loosening the fixation on the immoral, yet becoming
aware of the graceful among the ostensibly dutiful and (iii) realiz-
ing that the possibility of moral perception is ultimately interlocked
with graceful expressions in social interactions.
I
To the concert of contemporary ethics, theories of direct moral
perception contribute a genuine philosophical tune in claiming that one
could have direct sensory access to objective values without explicit de-
liberation or inference (Audi 2013, McGrath 2004, Wright 2008). Through
a critical reading of Schiller’s moral writings, in this paper I shall ques-
tion, redirect and enlarge the framework within which such theories are
situated. Particularly, I choose a reexamination of Schiller’s notions of
‘beautiful action’ and grace that can be positioned between Kant’s ratio-
nal ethical formalism and Aristotle’s emphasis on practical wisdom.
Schiller’s moral writings try to solve the paradox of freedom in nature.
Establishing ‘moral beauty’ as the highest form of character, and calling
for ‘gentility’ as beauty in social relations (Kallias, 174), Schiller’s expo-
sition offers an alternative to both Kantian rationalism and Humean
emotivism, one that speaks in the spirit of the enlightenment without be-
coming ‘sense-less’.
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In Letters upon the Aesthetic Education of Man, Schiller formu-
lates a programmatic synthesis of reason and affection in response to the
failures of the French Revolution. However, Schiller is by no means an
anti-rationalist. In his third letter, one can read that “man is not better
treated by nature in his first start than her other works are; so long as he
is unable to act for himself as an independent intelligence, she acts for
him” (AEM, 37). In order to accommodate the notion of freedom,
Schiller’s holistic anthropology subsequently binds moral sensation to
graceful acting. The claim for a natural bond between feeling and expres-
sion, as it is also stipulated in contemporary emotion research (see for an
overview Dunn et al. 2006 and Lindquist et al. 2012) ultimately pushes
the discussion of moral perception to a socio-political plane, which con-
temporary moral philosophy tends to disregard.
II
Schiller’s ethical interpretation of beauty as freedom’s appear-
ance is derived from Kantian thought and reminiscent of Aristotle’s dif-
ferentiation between the enkrates, i.e. those who are capable of temper-
ate actions but feel counter-pressure, and the genuinely virtuous capable
of ‘phronesis’, i.e. practical wisdom (NEVII.1, 1145a18-19).  While
Schiller’s moral philosophy overlaps with Kantian thought in its adher-
ence to a rational conception of duty (see Beiser 2005, especially chapter
5), Schiller’s inclusive conception of aesthetic existence differs from Kant
and his rigid reduction of morality and human life’s essence to dutiful
acting. Comparing Schiller’s and Kant’s moral philosophy, Beiser writes
that “Kant subordinates humanity to morality whereas Schiller subordi-
nates morality to humanity” (Beiser 2005, 186). Schiller’s moral promo-
tion of ‘play’ also deviates from Aristotle’s appraisal of knowledge and
rational endeavor as the highest good (NEI.5, 1095b17-1096a5). What
Schiller’s moral philosophy does share with Aristotle’s virtue ethics, and
what distinguishes its tone from Kantian thinking, is the explicit acknowl-
edgment of sensibility as an integral part of human morality.
On first glance, Schiller appears to demand simple harmony be-
tween moral principles and inclination that is also promoted in contem-
porary ethical discussions. For instance, departing from Julia Driver’s
virtue ethical treatment of Huckleberry Finn (Driver 2001), Michelle
Ciurria (2012) discusses three possible ethical constellations with regard
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to Huck helping Jim escape from slavery. One expresses what I wish to
call a ‘justice-cum-virtue’ equilibrium: when Huck helps Jim on both
‘deontic maxims’ (Ciurria 2012, 246) and his friendship to him. The oth-
ers constitute the remaining two possibilities in Ciurria’s framework. The
‘real’ fictional Huck believes that slavery is justified yet helps freeing Jim
as a friend, illustrating a subjective ‘justice-versus-virtue’ conflict. A sec-
ond Huck doppelganger is supposed to help Jim based on rational crite-
ria, however, without personal inclination, which comes close to the
Kantian ideal of rational duty. In order to demonstrate that Schiller’s aes-
thetic sublimation of Kantian ethics adds subtle nuances to the analysis of
the complex interplay between duty, virtue and emotion, I shall first refer
to Schiller’s five cases about a traveler in need for help, a mini-parable of
moral sensation that overlaps with, and enriches, Ciurria’s possible-world
fiction of ‘Huck-intentions’. I am going to deconstruct three of Schiller’s
five scenarios from his Kallias letters whose differences seem particu-
larly instructive for a metaethical review of moral sensation (I will not
quote the remaining two cases, yet briefly refer to them in my discus-
sion).
III
Schiller introduces a robbed man who got thrown onto the street.
Having been stripped of his clothes, he is freezing. Five travelers pass by.
The first case plays out as follows:
“I suffer with you”, says the moved traveler, “and I will
gladly give you what I have. I only request that you do not
ask for any of my services, since your appearance revolts
me. Here come some people, give them this purse and
they will help you”. __ “That is well meant”, said the
wounded man, “but one must also be able to see the suf-
fering if duty to humanity...requires it. Reaching for your
purse is not worth half as much as doing a little violence
to your tender senses. (Kallias, 157)
Schiller’s first traveler appears a pure sensual being whose ac-
tions are motivated by his natural state. Two divergent moments of the
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short scene are paradigmatic. “I suffer with you”, he says and shows em-
pathy that Schiller calls subsequently “kind-hearted out of affect”. Yet the
traveler does not want to help the robbed man personally since the latter’s
appearance revolts him. Hence, affection and empathy become blurred.
In terms of modern psychology, the first traveler in Schiller’s example
exhibits emotional ambivalence. This is not uncommon. Based on histori-
cal, conceptual and scientific evidence, Colombetti (2005) questions, for
instance, whether valence could actually be properly grasped in terms of
bipolarity, i.e. by qualifying emotions exclusively as either positive or
negative.
However, what Schiller seems to have in mind with his first trav-
eler is a conflict of two unrestrained diverse emotions, compassion and
aesthetic repulsion respectively. One does not encounter a single emotion
with ambivalent valence in this case, such as in a love-hate relationship. A
proper understanding of Schiller’s seemingly trivial example becomes fur-
ther problematic once one acknowledges that in contemporary emotion
research it is disputed whether emotions could, on natural grounds, be
individualized. Notably, against the ‘locationist’ view, constructivists ar-
gue that emotion categories signify concepts, rather than natural kinds,
similar to color distinctions. Constructivism supports the (nominalistic)
stance that talk of emotions is a mere reflection of how human beings
interpret and conceptualize emotional core affects, i.e. bodily sensations
of environment’s motivational salience (see Lindquist et al., 125).
Colombetti recalls that the term ‘valences’ is actually a rough trans-
lation of the German ‘Aufforderungscharaktere’ (‘invitation-characters’)
as it is used in the work of Kurt Lewin (Colombetti 2005, 104-5). Given
this connotation, one can build an interesting connection between emo-
tion valence and Jeremy J. Gibson’s ecological concept of ‘affordance’,
i.e. the perceptual evaluation of what an environment offers an organism
(Gibson 1979). I believe that the interpretation of perception as the result
of the interplay between (external) affordance and (internal) ‘ability’ (see
Greeno 1994) provides the most plausible psychological explanation of
how a direct grasp of values could be understood. Particularly, the notion
of affordance highlights ‘dialectic’ interaction of an organism with its en-
vironment that appears crucial for the analysis of value formation in sen-
sation. This, I posit, forms the conceptual framework within which one
should decipher Schiller’s scenarios.
Schiller’s first traveler, for instance, is feeling disgust when he
encounters the robbed man, as the latter’s appearance affords such a re-
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action. A contemporary view would stress that without certain neurobio-
logical ‘modules’, particularly insula and amygdala, it would be impos-
sible to generate disgust. Yet such a naturalistic approach cannot get rid
of the fact that perceptions and sensations have intentional content or at
least generate from an objective causal source. For an alternative organ-
ism that is equally equipped with insula, amygdala and other relevant
neural conditions, disgust vis-a-vis a robbed man could be out of ques-
tion, unless human appearance is treated as a matter of beauty, style and
decency. A guide dog, for instance, is supposed to be naturally demo-
cratic in her response to the outward appearance of a blind person she
should assist. In short: beliefs and inclinations are interwoven. It is this
holistic theme that makes Schiller’s robbed man parable a valuable case
study of moral philosophy.
That human culture plays variations on ‘raw’ emotions qua body
states can also be demonstrated with the second moment in the first
traveler’s ambivalent reaction, empathy and compassion. Indeed, investi-
gations into the contribution of shared neural networks in third-person
perception of pain suggest that especially male subjects make distinctions
between in- and out-group members in their empathy reactions. Further,
moral perception, in terms of pain empathy, appears to present a suffering
fellow human being first and foremost as an in- or out-group member
(see Singer and Steinbeis 2009). Thus, while empathy happens to be an
immediate reaction to seeing someone in pain, the association of a suffer-
ing individual with either an in- or out-group position defines whether
empathy augments to compassion, or rather turns into a feeling of re-
venge. The important detail in this is that in- or out-group classifications,
for instance in the evaluation of individuals who either support one’s fa-
vorite or rival soccer team in the case of the aforementioned study, deter-
mine the course of moral perception. That empathy, as the picking up of
the other’s pain sensation, would not be felt in isolation, but rather as
compassion or revenge, shows that from a phenomenological point of
view, there exists no isolated moral sense that in its entireness could be
pre-rationally located.
The subtlety with which Schiller presents the indicated holistic
picture of moral perception can be demonstrated with Schiller’s fourth
scenario. Here, two former enemies of the robbed man still offer help, but
without forgiveness for what the latter has done to them. Their motiva-
tion is simply that the robbed man appears ‘wretched’, i.e. it is situational.
Although the robbed man should be ‘out-grouped’ from the perspective
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of his enemies, momentary moral (or aesthetic?) affordance seems here
to overcome a more general and permanent cognitive disqualification.
Subsequently, Schiller seems to suggest a model of moral perception where
the interplay between ‘hic et nunc’ affordances and beliefs principally
yields open moral results, i.e. gives room to freedom.
Modern theories of direct moral perception suggest that ethical
values are directly accessible, and can be ‘seen’ independent from what
one believes. However, what one morally perceives is here meant to be
distinct even from ‘secondary’ qualities such as colors and shapes, and
moral values are supposed to supervene on, or have to be somehow ‘natu-
rally’ inferred from relevant base qualities (see Audi 2013 for such a po-
sition). In light of Schiller’s robbed men scenarios, such a position ap-
pears questionable as it (i) neglects belief/desire holism, (ii) involves in
the philosophically rather hopeless task of saving moral perception from
overlapping with intuition and emotion and (iii) posits moral naturalism
without a clear conception of objective moral properties.
On the contrary, Gibson’s dialectic notion of affordance, which
Schiller’s robbed man scenarios ‘prematurely’ exemplify, opens categori-
cal gateways to moral sensation that help escape the aforementioned dif-
ficulties. According to Gibson, “an affordance [...] points two ways, to
the environment and to the observer [...] This is only to reemphasize that
exteroception is accompanied by proprioception__that to perceive the world
is to co-perceive oneself. This is wholly inconsistent with dualism in any
form, either mind- matter dualism or mind-body dualism. The awareness
of the world and of one’s complementary relations to the world are not
separable”. (Gibson 1979, 129)
Gibson neutralizes here ontological implications of perception and
I would like to suggest that within a framework of moral affordances one
could philosophically address morality without plunging into the endur-
ing meta-ethical confrontations between cognitivism and non-cognitivism.
A proper ‘functional’ analysis of direct moral perception in terms of va-
lence import that leads to inclinations and desires in reaction to the envi-
ronment, rests basically on the one important differentiation, between
moral disposition and ability respectively. Dispositions materialize neces-
sarily within an appropriate environment, which only becomes suggestive
as to certain abilities. It appears perfectly sound to state that autistic people
are unable to both ‘see emotions of others and show empathy. Yet such a
formulation does not mean that ability automatically materializes under
particular circumstances. Being unable to do something is a subjective
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restriction, while being able to do something is only an opportunity.
In this sense, Schiller’s first traveler is picking up moral affordances
of the robbed man based on his sensory abilities. Whether the situation
presents ‘real’ values or rather initiates moral sensations, however, is a
question that becomes mute in light of anti-dualistic thinking. Further, in
accordance with belief/desire holism, his ability to sense moral affordance
is not independent from the traveler’s cognitive states. Considered a scam,
he hardly would get in conflict with aesthetic repulsion and be pressed to
offer a solution to the situation Schiller describes.
Gibson’s claim that proprioception is a constitutive component of
‘reality’ is particularly striking in relation to moral sensation when one
considers current research into the mirror neuron system (see Shapiro
2009) or, with similar implications, shared neural networks underpinning
empathy as discussed above. From the perspective of moral affordances,
Schiller’s robbed man scenarios exhibit an early intuitive recognition of
themes that contemporary social neuroscience imports into the examina-
tion of moral behavior. Schiller’s proximity to Kant’s ethics, however,
crucially transcends the neuroscience of moral sensation by asking one of
the most important philosophical questions of post-Newtonian philoso-
phy: how the notion of human freedom should be understood.
IV
The third traveler stands silently as the wounded man re-
peats the story of his misfortune. After the story has been
told the man stands there contemplatively and battling with
himself. “It will be difficult for me”, he says at last, “to
separate myself from my coat, which is the only protec-
tion for my sick body, and to leave you my horse since my
powers are at an end. But duty commands that I serve
you. (Kallias, 157-58)
Schiller’s third traveler exhibits outright moral rationality. In or-
der to put this feature into a broader context, let me briefly return to the
first scenario. Here, the traveler’s moral nature produces an immediate
conflict in response to the new situation. What is particularly noteworthy
in Schiller’s first robbed man scenario is its call for a “little violence to
one’s tender senses”, which indicates a particular tension between aes-
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thetic and moral sensation. In the original German, the critical adjective is
“weichlich”, which could be rephrased as ‘overly soft’ and actually car-
ries a more negative connotation, alluding to passivity, than the “tender”
in the quoted translation of Schiller’s letters. I believe that Schiller al-
ludes here to a point that is more systematically defined in Kant’s frame-
work of judgment types, particularly concerning its comparison and dif-
ferentiation of the pleasant and the good. Kant says that:
the pleasant and the good have both a reference to the
faculty of desire; and they bring with them the former a
satisfaction pathologically conditioned (by impulses,
stimuli) the latter a pure practical satisfaction, which is
determined not merely by the representation of the object,
but also by the represented connexion of the subject with
the existence of the object. (CoJ, Para. 5)
In Kant’s framework, there is no place for ethically justifying sen-
sation. If elevated to free imagination, and in emancipation from ‘patho-
logical’ impulses and stimuli, perception becomes aesthetic and thus loses
interest in the existence of what is perceived. According to Kant, disinter-
estedness is a necessary condition of judgments of taste. Ethical judg-
ments, however, need to be both free and interested in the existence of
their object, and thus can only generate from (formal) reason, which
Schiller’s third traveler exemplifies. Indeed, the traveler’s hesitant yet
dutiful action is in accordance with Kant’s rational conception of ethics,
yet not virtuous in Aristotle’s sense. Felt counter-pressure (“it will be
difficult for me...”) is for both Schiller and Aristotle morally suboptimal.
Schiller calls the third traveler’s action “purely moral”, yet against “the
interests of the senses”, which curiously stands in contrast to the demand
for “a little violence to one’s tender senses” in Schiller’s first case.
Schiller alludes in these cases to an important difference in how
moral reasoning and moral sensation can interplay. Both the first and
third traveler exhibits pathological inclinations that are the result of natu-
ral conditions. The third traveler, however, is able to silence his immedi-
ate motivation through considerations of duty, while the first can only
rationalize and adapt to, yet not overcome his ambivalent emotions. He
thus ends up with offering the robbed man his purse. The fifth traveler,
finally, exhibits moral sensation without conflict.
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As soon as the wanderer sees him, he lays down his load.
“I see”, he says of his own accord, “that you are wounded
and tired. The next village is far and you will bleed to
death ere you arrive there. Climb onto my back and I will
take you there”.__“But what will become of your load
which you leave here on the open road”.__“That I don’t
know, and it concerns me little”, says the carrier. “I do
know, however, that you need help and that I am obliged
to give it to you. (Kallias, 158)
Duty and desire coincide here, forming the ideal of a virtuous
‘beautiful’ action. Schiller’s second scenario has still remained unmen-
tioned. Exemplifying an economic model of care, here a traveler asks for
compensation, which the robbed man rejects for a lack of “readiness to
help”. In a final assessment of all five variations of his robbed man case,
Schiller says that
all five wanted to help [...] One of them acted out of purest moral
purpose. But only the fifth acted without solicitation, without con-
sidering the action, and disregarding the cost to himself. Only the
fifth...’fulfilled his duty with the ease of someone acting out of
mere instinct’. __ Thus, a moral action would be a beautiful action
only if it appears as an immediate [...] outcome of nature. In a
word: a free action is a beautiful action, if the autonomy of the
mind and autonomy of appearance coincide. (Kallias, 159)
In line with the quoted passage, one can define virtues as the ex-
pression of ‘mindful nature’. Unlike the first, the fifth traveler demon-
strates character rather than spontaneous emotion and undirected empa-
thy. Further, in contrast to the third, his senses are in harmony with Kantian
duty. Hence, Schiller’s fifth case illustrates what I called above ‘justice-
cum-virtue’. The idea of beautiful acting must assume plasticity with re-
gard to human nature’s endowment that allows for motivational approxi-
mation to laws of reason, a point it shares with Aristotle’s virtue ethics.
Neither judgments of sense, i.e. pure instinctive reactions, nor economic
trade-offs qualify as ethical justifications. However, it is important to notice
that Schiller’s illustrates an ideal harmony between the autonomy of the
mind and the autonomy of nature’s appearance. Obviously, for the
‘Kantian’ Schiller nature is fully determined by physical laws. Only man;s
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superior subjective faculties, reason and imagination, can generate the
impression that nature is free and beautiful. Injected into morality, where
human nature is the ‘material’, this can only mean that beautiful acting
must present nature in free form, i.e. as self-determined. A semiotic me-
diation between moral sensation and graceful expression in Schiller’s
aestheticized moral philosophy differentiates it from both Aristotle’s vir-
tue ethics and rational accounts of moral reasoning. Further, by making
the robbed man the subject, rather than the object of moral perception,
Schiller turns the table on contemporary approaches to moral sensation.
V
In order to capture Schiller’s implicit view on moral perception,
his moral philosophy’s overall signature requires some attention. For a
comparison, let me highlight that Aristotle’s virtue ethics demands emo-
tional fine-tuning that only experience and moral practice can teach. For-
mal rationality is thus considered insufficient as source for the under-
standing of morality. Schiller equally emphasizes the indispensability of
man’s natural conditions in moral formation, but he is nowhere as ada-
mant as Aristotle in pointing at particularizing emotions. Schiller’s pro-
gram, on the contrary, is characterized by the search for the ultimate har-
mony between natural diversity and rational unity. Schiller writes that
education will always appear deficient when the moral feel-
ing can only be maintained with the sacrifice of what is
natural; and a political administration will always be very
imperfect when it is only able to bring about unity by sup-
pressing variety. (AEM, 40-1)
Distancing himself from the enlightenment’s rational monotony,
and, like Aristotle, subscribing to a ‘holistic’ anthropology, Schiller fa-
mously aims at solving this perpetual moral conflict between reason and
inclination in human nature through a generous notion of ‘play’. He states
that
when we welcome with effusion some one who deserves
our contempt, we feel painfully that nature is constrained.
When we have a hostile feeling against a person who com-
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mands our esteem, we feel painfully the constraint of rea-
son. But if this person inspires us with interest, and also
wins our esteem, the constraint of feeling vanishes to-
gether with the constraint of reason, and we begin to love
him, that is to say, to play, to take recreation, at once with
our inclination and our esteem. (AEM, 75)
Schiller’s ‘playful’ synthesis of ethics and aesthetics could be
viewed as overly romantic and idealistic. Further, when Schiller urges to
“put morality in the place of manners” (AEM, 81), his notion of moral
beauty seems to associate with the aristocratic etiquette in the 18th cen-
tury that the then emerging European bourgeoisie has been adopting.
When Schiller uses the English dance of his time as an allegory for a free
society, an aristocratic connotation of his notions of grace and gentility is
hard to deny, for instance, when one reads that “the spectator in the gal-
lery sees countless movements which cross each other colourfully and
change their direction wilfully but never collide” (Kallias, 174, italics are
original).
Yet while one could indeed decipher Schiller’s moral philosophy
as mere intellectual poesy, or deconstruct some of its paragraphs as an
elitist promotion of moral etiquette and mannerism, there exists probably
no genuine ethical theory that juxtaposes so eloquently the ‘what’ of act-
ing with its ‘how’. Indeed, in formulating his notion of moral beauty,
Schiller is much more dialectic than both Aristotle and Kant. Freedom,
Schiller writes, stands above both the necessities of reason and nature:
“But the will of man is perfectly free between inclination and duty, and no
physical necessity ought to enter as a sharer in this magisterial personal-
ity”. (AEM, 40).
Schiller advocates neither Kantian freedom from nature, nor un-
restrained emotion, but rather a concept of personality that symbolizes
unrestrained free play between duty and inclination vis-a-vis a loved per-
son. The notions of love and play explain here deeds that appear right as
much as they are desired. Both ‘false empathy’ and ‘reason’s rigidity’, as
one could phrase it, disappear in beautiful acting. In order to make sense
of this condition, however, one has to further address Schiller’s semiotic
view on movement as a necessary constituent of human action.
In his seminal Letters upon the Aesthetic Education of Man,
Schiller elaborates through the notion of play the paradigmatic synthesis
of reason and sensation as the ultimate foundation of moral education. In
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his slightly earlier theoretical reflections in On Grace and Dignity and his
Kallias letters, one can additionally find passages that also offer crucial
semiotic substructure. In the former of these two 1793 writings, Schiller
contemplates on what could be called ‘physiognomy of sentient expres-
sion’, while the latter, in sequences that follow the robbed-man-parable
from which I quoted above, particularly discusses the notion of technique
as a ‘negative’, yet necessary condition of nature’s free appearance. These
subtexts direct our attention to semiotic transformations of nature that
indicate a moral dimension. Herein lies, as I shall demonstrate in the final
considerations of this paper, Schiller’s genuine contribution to the analy-
sis of moral perception and its role in moral philosophy.
Schiller’s notion of grace is supposed to transcend the mere beau-
tiful of the aesthetic realm. Beauty already associates the two separate
worlds of necessities, reason and nature, thus leading the way to freedom
and autonomy in appearance. Grace, however, as an attribute of human
acting that can be perceived, elevates beauty to the expression of moral
character. Schiller defends the concepts of personality and individuality
against Kant by arguing that only through the moral sentient condition (in
German, “Empfindung”), both rational duty and human nature can be
done justice (see especially GD, 206-7).
Schiller speaks of grace as the symbol for “inclination to duty”,
whereby grace is beauty that stems from the moral sentient condition.
Representation of beauty, however, is according to Schiller “technique in
freedom” (Kallias, 162). Thus, grace must also involve technique, i.e.
formal artfulness. It is not easy to decipher Schiller’s multi-faceted dis-
cussion at this intersection between On Grace and Dignity and his Kallias
letters, yet a close look reveals an underpinning core notion of move-
ment.
For instance, Schiller exemplifies the appearance of freedom with
the trope of overcoming the general and alien force of gravity: “We per-
ceive everything to be beautiful [...] in which mass is completely domi-
nated by form (in the animal and plant kingdom) and by living forces (in
the autonomy of the organic)” (Kallias, 164).
The primacy of beauty in movement also shines through in ex-
amples where Schiller does not address literal movement, such as in the
case of a bird in flight or a horse’s light motion. Prototypical for ‘static
movement’ is here Schiller’s reference to a curved line, as opposed to one
with abrupt changes in direction (Kallias, 173). Thus, Schiller seems to
base moral beauty on movement even where a genuine temporal param-
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eter drops out. Contemporary neuroscience strikingly supports Schiller’s
reflection at this point (see Freedberg and Gallese, 2007).
However, Schiller demands more from beauty than ‘motion em-
pathy’. Beauty only emerges when nature appears as “following its own
will” (Kallias, 170). This temporal component carries over into Schiller’s
definition of grace:
Grace can be found only in movement, for a modification
which takes place in the soul can only be manifested in the
sensuous world as movement. But this does not prevent
features fixed and in repose also from possessing grace.
There immobility is, in its origin, movement which, from
being frequently repeated, at length becomes habitual, leav-
ing durable traces. (GD, 188)
Note that Schiller characterizes the human condition through act
potentials. Actions are willful manifestations in time, whose modality can
give expression to the synthesis of reason and sensibility, the active and
the passive, the voluntary and involuntary, and thus accommodate one’s
personality:
When I extend the arm to seize an object, I execute, in
truth, an intention, and the movement I make is deter-
mined in general by the end that I have in view; but in
what way does my arm approach the object? how far do
the other parts of my body follow this impulsion? What
will be the degree of slowness or of the rapidity of the
movement? What amount of force shall I employ? This is
a calculation of which my will, at the instant, takes no
account, and in consequence there is a something left to
the discretion of nature. (GD, 190-1)
Schiller’s emphasis on the physiognomy of an action can be put in
the context of modern sociology, Goffman’s work on symbolic interac-
tion (see Goffman 1959 & 2005) and, particularly, Bourdieu’s notion of
habitus and social distinction (Bourdieu 1977). Yet, as aforementioned,
while a critical deconstruction of Schiller’s moral philosophy could find
its demand for grace and gentility discriminatory and elitist, one has to
read Schiller’s appraisal of Kantian duty, i.e. rational freedom, against
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such an account. Note that in Schiller’s example, as discussed in this
article’s initial section, the first traveler’s reaction to the robbed man’s
misery is deemed inappropriate because of the traveler’s affection pre-
venting him from accepting the required “little violence to his tender
senses”.
Schiller’s allegory of freedom in animals’ movements should ex-
emplify that, while the necessities of nature, i.e. gravity, can factually not
be overcome, they still can ‘disappear’ in the expression and perception
of motion. Similarly, grace is for Schiller the ethical disposition to display
emancipation from nature, rather than a mere matter of distinct and dis-
tinguishing social habitus. Schiller addresses here, besides movement, par-
ticularly facial mimicry and physiognomy that “speak”. He states:
I call speaking...every physical phenomenon which accom-
panies and expresses a certain state of the soul; thus, in
this acceptation, all the sympathetic movements are speak-
ing, including those which accompany the simple affec-
tions of the animal sensibility. [...] To take the word in a
more restricted sense, the configuration of man alone is
speaking, and it is itself so only in those of the phenomena
that accompany and express the state of its moral sensibil-
ity. (GD, 194-5)
Schiller’s contemporary Kleist, in his philosophical dialogue On
the Marionette Theater, counters Schiller’s conception of grace. Only
blind nature (or god), says the main protagonist in Kleist’s literary con-
versation, are capable of pure grace, which the naturally balanced move-
ments of marionettes symbolize. Consciousness, on the contrary, imports
reflection, and thus hesitation, to human performance and expression.
Kleist claims that “we can see the degree to which contemplation be-
comes darker and weaker in the organic world, so that the grace that is
there emerges all the more shining and triumphant” (Kleist and Neumiller
1972, 26).
Kleist overlooks that marionettes would neither perceive grace
nor form its notion. Schiller insists on sensation as an anthropological
necessity that secures subjectivity, i.e. personal identity, through one’s
actions. Unformed natural expressions are ‘dumb’. They can display indi-
viduality, but never constitute personality (GD, 196-7). On the contrary,
grace symbolizes the ideal harmony between moral duty and movements
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that, as constituents of actions, stems from acquired sensual conditions
Schiller adapts Kant’s dualistic metaphysics in its distinction be-
tween laws of nature and laws of freedom. In Schiller’s thinking, tech-
nique mediates between these separate worlds by bringing freedom into
appearance. Technique imports the impression of autonomous rules and
regularities into the sensual realm that otherwise would be perceived un-
der the influence of heteronomous physical forces. Yet according to
Schiller, one reaches artfulness only when technique promotes freedom,
i.e. autonomy in appearance. Such aesthetic transformation of the physi-
cal realm happens when one perceives beauty in nature, in artworks and,
finally, on a moral plane, in human acting. In the latter case, the beautiful
generates from a subjective sensual disposition that enables the necessary
metamorphosis, from passive nature to the active embodiment of moral-
ity in grace.
VI
Schiller’s secondary notion of technique turns moral perception
ultimately into a subject of social critique. Only through cooperative tech-
niques graceful behavior and its perception can ‘playfully’ develop and
personality be put in a position where choice between inclination and
duty is free. In terms of philosophical anthropology, Schiller’s conception
of grace reminds us of the constitutive, ‘transcendental’, conditions of
human interaction, and could be read as an ‘embodied’ supplement to
discourse ethics (see Habermas 1991).
Schiller’s example of the English dance as a symbolic expression
of individual freedom in group-action illustrates a ‘social score’ that al-
lows for free play and ‘beautiful’ acting in accordance with duty. In this
point, Schiller’s thinking is actually closer related to Gadamer’s ontologi-
cal analysis of ‘play’ in Truth and Method (1975) than to, say, Marcuse’s
Neo-Freudian and subjectivistic re-interpretation of Schiller’s ideal of
aestheticized ethos (Marcuse 1955). Although Gadamer explicitly seeks
distance from Kant’s and Schiller’s subjective interpretation of ‘play’
(Gadamer 1975, 102), his definition of play as “transformation into struc-
ture” (110) resembles the crucial ‘objective’ component in aesthetic prac-
tice that Schiller also alludes to when he makes ‘technique’ a condition
for freedom in appearance. Certainly, Gadamer’s emphasis on pure ap-
pearance of what is played, in contrast to the intentional states of the
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players, overlaps partially with the impersonal characteristic of Kleist’s
marionettes. This becomes particularly obvious when Gadamer points at
impersonal expressions such as “the play of light” or “the play of the
waves” (104). Yet the ontological autonomy of play as structure also
defines human play that is interwoven with intentionality:
The playing field on which the game is played is, as it
were, set by the nature of the game itself and is defined far
more by the structure that determines the movement of
the game from within than by what is comes up against
[...] it seems to me characteristic of human play that it
plays something. That means that the structure of move-
ment to which it submits has a definite quality which the
player ‘chooses’. (Gadamer 1975, 144)
The example of (physical) queuing might help demonstrate a cat-
egorical connection between Gadamer’s ontological analysis of play and
Schiller’s notion of grace and gentility, that, if interpreted as social prac-
tices, no framework of moral perception should overlook. Queuing can
be seen as a miniature social system that is essentially linked to the social
construction of time (see Mann 1969). In light of my discussion hitherto,
it is a kind of ‘play’ that can be performed gracefully, similar to the En-
glish dance Schiller uses as an example. Grace would definitely call for
subtle dispositions in relation to movements in public space when one
joins a group that is waiting for something. Whether one grants excep-
tions, how someone who jumps the queue is addressed, or which tempo-
rary adjustments in the line-up are deemed acceptable when a newcomer
sees a friend who is already waiting in line, are all issues that contribute to
the overall functioning of this particular social subsystem. There are defi-
nitely different cultural forms of (mis)handling queuing, and there is cer-
tain room for personal interpretation of the playfield, yet common grace-
ful behavior and interaction would certainly demonstrate a kind of ‘ob-
jective’ social ethos that echoes Gadamer’s aesthetic ontology of play.
What is now particularly interesting is that ‘graceful queuing’ rests also
on material conditions. If a group grows into a critical mass, or the avail-
able public space is too small for a decent line, for instance, the game
cannot be played gracefully, independent from the players’ ethos.
The structural objectivity of play and social practices, i.e. human
(inter)action, contradicts only on the surface with Schiller’s demand for
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genuine personal sensation and motivation. Rather, the structural autonomy
of play appears necessary in order to establish technique and regularity in
what Schiller calls ‘beautiful acting’. While for Schiller grace reflects the
“portion of the intentional movements to which the intention of the sub-
ject is unknown” (Schiller GD, 190), Gadamer specifies that this uninten-
tional element needs an objective counterpart in order to be comprehen-
sive: “The real subject of the game [...] is not the player but instead the
game itself. What holds the player in its spell, draws him into play, and
keeps him there is the game itself” (Gadamer 1975, 106).
Gadamer acknowledges the “seriousness” (106) of playing as the
enjoyment in framed decision-making and risk taking. Schiller, however,
adds an explicit requirement of authenticity that, one could conclude,
must naturally occur when someone is “drawn into play”. For Schiller, as
already underscored with reference to Kleist’s marionettes, artful tech-
niques without genuine sensation must remain a parody of grace:
It is true that a man, by dint of art and of study, can at last
arrive at this result, to subdue to his will even the con-
comitant movements; and, like a clever juggler, to shape
according to his pleasure such or such a physiognomy upon
the mirror from which his soul is reflected through mimic
action. But then, with such a man all is dissembling, and
art entirely absorbs nature. The true grace, on the con-
trary, ought always to be pure nature, that is to say, invol-
untary (or at least appear to be so), to be graceful. The
subject even ought not to appear to know that it possesses
grace. (GD, 192)
Moral affordances of a particular situation create potentially am-
biguous and continuously orderable proprioception whose valence and
strength are crucial in deciding whether one acts in accordance, or against
applicable moral principles. An annihilation of cognitive dissonance in
this interplay, i.e. grace, is not only a matter of whether an agent has been
able to reshape her natural moral dispositions. Further, she has to become
confident that her action’s recipient would actually perceive her sponta-
neous conciliation of inclination and reason as graceful. Such a frame-
work of mutual understanding through acting and perceiving must be
embedded in common social practices. Without the structure of ‘social
play’, like in Schiller’s paradigmatic example of the English dance, nei-
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ther the expression nor the perception of grace would be possible.
Subsequently, grace correlates with socially constituted moral
abilities, i.e. the creation and perception of movements and expressions
in social space that are dignified and morally beautiful. In this view, direct
moral perception is not merely concerned with the epistemic detection of
virtue or vice, but with both the sensation and the creation of moral beauty,
freedom and love, which only can be achieved when moral dispositions
are brought into harmony with moral and fact related beliefs. Schiller’s
moral writings serve here as a reminder that ethics must not overlook that
without adequate social platforms that facilitate a common moral
‘semiotics’, this process can hardly be initiated and cultivated.
VII
I have argued that Schiller’s moral philosophy promotes both the
naturalizing and ‘politicizing’ of moral perception. Its notion of grace
suggests an expansion, if not redirection of the philosophical analysis of
direct moral perception as it is presented in contemporary moral philoso-
phy. Particularly, Schiller implicitly abandons both the subject-object and
acting-perceiving dichotomy and is thus is line with certain theoretical
implications of contemporary psychology and social cognitive neuro-
science. Further, my deconstruction of Schiller’s moral philosophy could
be summarized in the ontological claim that the social and the moral world
essentially coincide, since both generate from our actions and percep-
tions. Schiller’s secondary notions of movement and technique stipulate
that the physiognomy and expression of actions are essential not only for
how they are morally perceived, but also for the determination of what
encompasses the moral world, which current theories of moral percep-
tion tend to overlook.
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